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1 Introduction
An important dimension of wage-setting negotiations is the level where collective contracts are
formally set. Between the 1970s and the 1990s it appears that no country moved towards a more
centralised system, and most countries progressively adopted wage-setting institutions charac-
terised by a lower degree of centralisation (OECD, 2004). For instance, in the US, Canada and
Japan wage negotiations are decentralised at the firm-level. More recently, the UK and New
Zealand joined this group of countries. Furthermore, countries such as Germany that tradition-
ally negotiated over wages at a relatively high degree of centralisation adopted “intermediate”
systems, which permit wage adjustments at the firm level while negotiations remain under the
auspices of an industry union (Haucap and Wey, 2004).
Since the mid-1970s we have also witnessed an upsurge in the extent of R&D collaborations
between firms. This has led to the so-called “age of alliance capitalism” (Narula and Duysters,
2004), where hi-tech firms collaborate in a variety of ways to share know-how and enhance
technological capabilities. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that the importance of non-
equity types of collaboration, such as R&D networks, has increased strongly relative to more
traditional, equity-based alliances, such as research joint ventures. For example, in the cases
of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, Roijakkers and Hagedoorn (2006) show that non-equity
forms of collaborative activity grew steadily in relative importance during the 1980s and 1990s,
accounting recently for more than 90% of the total number of R&D collaborations.
Motivated by the aforementioned stylised facts — labour market deregulation and the spread
of R&D networks between firms — the following question arises: Might recent trends towards
introducing more flexibility into wage-setting have increased the profitability of R&D collabo-
rations between firms, and hence contributed to the spread of R&D networks? In this paper we
use a model of endogenous network formation to address this question.
Our central results emerge from comparing firms’ network formation decisions under three
2
distinct wage-setting regimes — “centralisation”, “coordination” and “decentralisation”.1 Under
centralisation, a single industry-wide union sets a uniform wage for all workers; whereas, under
coordination, it sets discriminatory wages between firms. In contrast, under decentralisation,
there are independent firm-level unions. Thus, centralisation and decentralisation can be seen
as polar cases, whereas coordination can be seen as intermediate. In the context of a three-
firm model with endogenous R&D investments, we show that the transition from centralised to
decentralised wage-setting causes the number of R&D links between firms to rise. This is our
central result, and it is consistent with the stylised facts documented above.
The paper closest in spirit to ours is Mauleon et al. (2008), who study R&D network forma-
tion in a decentralised regime of firm-level unions. In that context, the authors demonstrate the
emergence of the complete R&D network, where each firm maintains links with both its rivals.
Imagine that two firms are linked and the third is isolated — that is, the R&D network has an
insider/outsider or partial pattern. In that case, the linked firms will pay higher wages than the
isolated firm. This is because unions set wages after firms have made their R&D collaboration
and investment decisions.2 Linked firms thus face a hold-up problem, whereby higher levels
of R&D investment/collaboration induce higher wages. However, this wage premium means
that the linked firms suffer in product-market competition. By bringing the outsider into the
R&D network, which increases the outsider’s access to R&D and thus its wage, the two insiders
are able to reduce this “business stealing” effect. Therefore, the complete network emerges
endogenously under decentralisation.
Our results for centralised wage-setting, which represents the other extreme to decentrali-
sation, are new. With a uniform wage, the isolated firm that faces two linked rivals is unable
to benefit from a lower wage. Thus, the business stealing effect is absent, and the linked firms
have no incentive to expand their partial R&D network in order to raise their rival’s costs.
1Our terminology here follows Haucap and Wey (2004).
2This sequencing of moves reflects the fact that wages are relatively easy to alter.
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Therefore, under centralisation, only one R&D link is established within the industry, and an
insider/outsider formation results.
Consider next the intermediate case of coordinated wage-setting, where an industry-wide
union sets firm-specific wages. In that case, we show that the complete R&D network arises in
equilibrium, but only if within-network R&D spillovers are sufficiently small. The basic intuition
for the emergence of the complete network is similar to the decentralised case: when wages can
differ across firms, linked firms pay a wage ‘penalty’ due to their higher cost efficiency. However,
the industry-wide union internalises the business stealing effect created by the wage cut at the
isolated firm — in a way that does not occur when three independent unions compete under
decentralisation. Therefore, under coordination, the complete network emerges endogenously,
but it is less attractive than under decentralisation.
Our paper contributes to three main strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the
rapidly expanding literature on R&D networks. The seminal paper by Goyal and Moraga-
González (2001) and several extensions (see e.g. Deroian and Gannon, 2006; Zikos, 2010;
Zirulia, 2012) offer models of horizontal R&D networks. This line of research has generally
ignored the role of input markets on network formation, though a notable exception is Mauleon
et al., as explained above.3 Importantly, however, our results on the effects of labour market
deregulation contrast sharply with those arising in Mauleon et al. (2008), where the focus is on
the distribution of bargaining power rather than, as here, changes in labour market structure.
Under the assumption that wage bargaining is decentralised to firm-level unions, Mauleon et
al. show that more inter-firm R&D collaboration links tend to emerge when bargaining power
rests with the unions rather than with the firms. However, the finding that the intensity of
R&D collaborations should be positively correlated with union bargaining power is empirically
troubling because the stylised facts surveyed earlier suggest the opposite — across industrialised
3Together with Mauleon et al. (2008), our paper can be thought of as an attempt to extend the R&D network
literature vertically by examining the effects of different unionisation structures on firms’ incentives to establish
collaborative R&D links.
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countries, inter-firm R&D collaborations have become hugely more prevalent as labour markets
have been deregulated and unions weakened.4
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on unionisation and innovation. In contrast
to our model, most existing studies of trade unions and R&D concentrate on how the presence
of unions affects the R&D incentives of individual (isolated) firms.5 A generic finding is that
decentralised unions discourage R&D due to the hold-up problem. However, offsetting that, we
show that decentralised unions promote the formation of R&D links and the complete R&D
network — thus increasing the extent to which R&D results are effectively applied to production.
Analysing this additional avenue — network formation — through which unions can affect R&D
performance is a contribution of this paper.
In the same line of research, the analysis by Mukherjee and Pennings (2011) is closest to
our own. The authors develop a model to study the impact of unionisation structure on firms’
incentives for technology licensing and innovation. Interestingly, the main mechanism that de-
termines licensing decisions in their paper also determines firms’ incentives to form network
links in our paper. In particular, the intensity of the hold-up problem faced by linked firms is
reduced by competing trade unions under decentralisation, while it is reduced by the unifor-
mity rule under centralisation (Mukherjee and Pennings, 2011).6 As it turns out, competition
between decentralised unions — in line with Mukherjee and Pennings (2011) — implies a more
effective mechanism in mitigating the hold-up problem, and thus, it encourages the creation of
more links between firms.
Finally, our analysis is related to the literature that analyses R&D collaborations within re-
search joint ventures (RJVs).7 Building on the influential paper by d’ Aspremont and Jacquemin
4We should note, however, that Mauleon et al. present supportive data for their results from the Canadian
biotech industry.
5See, for example, Grout (1984), Tauman and Weiss (1987), Ulph and Ulph (1994, 2001), Calabuig and
González-Maestre (2002), Haucap and Wey (2004), and Menezes-Filho et al. (1998) for empirical evidence.
6The case of a coordinated regime can be seen as an intermediate situation.
7See, for example, d’ Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988); Suzumura (1992); Poyago-Theotoky (1995); Kamien,
Muller and Zang (1992); Amir (2000).
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(1988), Manasakis and Petrakis (2009) show that the incentives to form RJVs under decen-
tralised vis-à-vis centralised unions are sensitive to the extent of public spillovers. There are,
however, two important differences between this line of work and our paper. First, it is typi-
cally assumed that all firms within the industry participate in the RJV — so questions about the
extent of the network cannot be addressed. Second, it is assumed that R&D investments are
determined co-operatively.8 In contrast, an R&D network is a non-equity form of collaboration,
as explained above. Thus, firms retain their own R&D labs and agree to pool their R&D results
by forming collaborative links.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section presents our model
and our equilibrium concepts. Section 3 analyses the cases of decentralised and centralised
wage-setting, and considers the impact of labour market deregulation. Section 4 analyses the
intermediate regime of coordinated wage-setting. Section 5 discusses various aspects of our
results, particularly their relation to the wider literature and their normative properties. Finally,
section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Sequence of moves. Three firms are competing to supply the market for a homogeneous
good. Following Mauleon et al. (2008), MSMV hereafter, our game has four stages. In stage
one, the firms form collaboration links between themselves for the sharing of R&D results. In
stage two, firms carry out their process R&D investments simultaneously and independently.
In stage three, wage rates are determined (they may be firm-specific or common). Finally, in
stage four, the firms compete à la Cournot on the product market, subject to the linear inverse
demand function  =  −P31 .9 This sequencing can be justified by considering the relative
8An exception to the norm of R&D co-operation, which is closer in spirit to our approach, is the “RJV
competition” case of Kamien et al. (1992).
9Our qualitative results survive if we assume instead Bertrand competition with differentiated goods. Com-
putations available on request.
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degrees of commitment in each decision — for example, wages are easier to change than R&D
investments.
Marginal costs, and R&D investments and outputs. Marginal costs are constant,
and they can be reduced by both process R&D investment and the formation of collaboration
links to pool R&D outputs with other firms. We assume that the production of one unit of
the final good requires one unit of labour (paid wage ), and that R&D works to reduce the
non-labour part of marginal cost (initially equal to ).10 Firm ’s R&D output is , and the
associated R&D investment cost is 2 .
Our assumption that firms choose their R&D investments independently captures a lack of
trust between network partners. It reflects the fact that it is not possible to write complete
contracts on R&D behaviour. This is a natural assumption because R&D investments are often
hard to observe (e.g. when a multi-product firm maintains a single research lab) and R&D
outputs are often unknowable ex ante.
Collaboration networks and R&D spillovers. Network formation affects marginal
costs because it allows access to other firms’ R&D outputs. Like the existing literature on R&D
networks (e.g. Goyal and Moraga-González, 2001), we assume that the formation of R&D links
between firms is costless.
In a triopoly, four distinct R&D networks are possible — see Figure 1.
The complete networkThe star network
The empty network The partial network
1
3
2
1
1 2
3
2
3
1 2
3
10This is consistent with R&D reducing the capital/labour ratio within a Leontief production function. Note
that, depending on the system of wage-setting, the wage  may be firm-specific or common.
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Figure 1: Network Architectures
In the empty network, there are no links between firms, and each firm’s marginal cost is
given by
 = + − , where  ∈ {1 2 3}
The other three networks all contain links between firms. These collaboration links give
firms access to the R&D outputs of their partner/s. In the partial network, a single link exists
— and we assume, w.l.o.g., that this is between firms 1 and 2, the insiders. Marginal costs are
thus given by
Insiders:  = +  −  −  , where   ∈ {1 2} and  6= 
Outsider: 3 = + 3 − 3, as in the empty network
Thus, each insider enjoys access to a proportion  ∈ [0 1] of its partner’s R&D output.
In the star network, there are two links, creating a hub-and-spoke pattern. W.l.o.g., we
assume that firm 1 is the hub. Firms 2 and 3, the spokes, receive direct access to firm 1’s R&D
output, and they can also access — indirectly, via the hub — the R&D output of the other spoke.
To capture this relatively large distance within the network between the spokes, we assume that
each spoke only receives a proportion 2 of the other spoke’s R&D output. Thus,
Hub: 1 = + 1 − 1 −  (2 + 3)
Spokes:  = +  −  − 1 − 
2
 , where   ∈ {2 3} and  6= 
Finally, in the complete network, each firm maintains two links, and marginal costs are given
by
 = +  −  −  ( + ) , where    ∈ {1 2 3} and  6=  6= 
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Wage-setting. Wages are set in stage three, and we consider three distinct wage-setting
regimes (following Haucap and Wey, 2004). We assume that wages are set unilaterally by the
respective labour union/s — the “monopoly union” model — and we normalise the reservation
wage to 0.11
Under decentralisation, there are three independent firm-specific unions, each of which sets
 to maximise its firm’s wage bill,  where  ∈ {1 2 3}. (Recall that employment = output
by assumption.) Alternatively, there might be a single, industry-wide union, and the issue then
is whether that single union sets a uniform wage for all workers in the industry, which we term
centralisation, or firm-specific wages, which we term coordination. Thus, under centralised wage-
setting, the union sets  to maximise P31  where  ∈ {1 2 3}; whereas under coordinated
wage-setting, it sets  to maximise P31.
A key assumption is that workers are not mobile across unions — thus, wage differences
across firms can be sustained. (For example, workers may have undertaken firm-specific train-
ing, which increases their switching costs and creates “lock-in”.) In terms of the degree of
“centralisation” in wage-setting, we see the decentralisation and centralisation regimes as ex-
tremes, with coordinated wage-setting as an intermediate case.
We take the wage-setting regime as exogenous. Labour market institutions are typically
economy-wide and often determined by national legislation, so it is reasonable to assume that
the wage-setting regime is exogenous to any particular industry.
2.1 Equilibrium concepts
We solve the game backwards from stage 4 (Cournot competition) to stage 2 (R&D investments)
inclusive. Thus, network-formation decisions in stage 1 take into account the subsequent effects
on R&D levels, wages and outputs — and equilibrium solutions for these variables are given in
11We adopt the monopoly union model for simplicity. We expect our qualitative results to survive under the
more general right-to-manage bargaining model — as long as the union/s possess some bargaining power to drive
wages above the exogenous reservation level.
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the Appendix.
We use two well-established equilibrium concepts for network formation in stage 1. Following
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), we say that a network is pairwise stable if no firm benefits
from unilaterally severing one of its R&D links and no two firms benefit from adding a new link
between them. If we think of the four possible network architectures as arranged in the sequence
{emptypartial star complete}, then pairwise stability refers to a deviation to a neighbouring
architecture.
To derive our main results, we use the strong stability notion of Jackson and van den
Nouweland (2005), which is a refinement of pairwise stability.12 A strongly stable network is
one that is stable against changes in R&D links by any coalition of firms within the industry
— because at least one firm in the coalition would lose from the proposed group deviation.
Thus, in terms of the four-network sequence above, strong stability considers deviations to any
alternative architecture.
It is important to note that both of these network equilibrium concepts rule out side pay-
ments between firms. If such side payments were permitted and binding contracts could be
written, then we would expect the R&D network to emerge that maximises industry profits. In
contrast, industry profits provide no guide to either pairwise or strong stability.13
Notation for equilibrium profits. We adopt the following notation for equilibrium
profits, which exploits the symmetries across firms:
Π denotes a firm’s profits in the empty network;
Π denotes the profits of an insider (linked) firm in the partial network;
Π denotes the profits of outsider (isolated) firm in the partial network;
Π denotes the hub firm’s profits in the star network;
12Thus, only pairwise stable networks can be strongly stable.
13For all three wage-setting regimes, the complete network maximises industry profits for almost all . However,
the complete network is not always strongly stable, and under centralisation the alternative, partial network is
the unique strongly stable network.
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Π denotes a spoke firm’s profits in the star network; and
Π denotes a firm’s profits in the complete network.
3 Equilibrium network structures
3.1 Decentralised wage-setting
The institutional regime of decentralised negotiations is prevalent in Canada, Japan, Korea, and
the United States, which traditionally engaged in negotiations at the firm-level. More recently,
the United Kingdom, New Zealand and some eastern European countries have also adopted the
same form of wage negotiations.
Decentralisation is formally identical to the unions-set-wages case in MSMV, so we merely
report the key results briefly.
Proposition 1 (MSMV, 2008): Under decentralised wage-setting, the complete network is
the unique pairwise and strongly stable network for all levels of within-network R&D
spillovers.
For all levels of spillovers within a network , the following ranking of firms’ profits holds:14
Π  Π  Π Π  Π  Π (1)
Note that the first two terms are separated by a comma, not . Specifically, Π  Π if and
only if   012; otherwise, Π  Π . This ranking implies that, in the empty, partial and star
networks, two unconnected firms would both gain by forming a new link between themselves,15
so the complete network is the only pairwise stable network and thus the only candidate for
strong stability. Turning to strong stability, from the complete network, the three firms will not
14Plots of equilibrium firm-level profits are available from the authors on request.
15Proof: Π  Π so the empty network is not pairwise stable; Π  Π and Π  Π so the partial network
is not pairwise stable; and Π  Π so the star network is not pairwise stable. Of course, Π  Π also implies
that the complete network is pairwise stable — no firm will unilaterally delete a link to become a spoke.
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deviate to the empty network (because Π  Π), and pairwise stability rules out a deviation
to the star. Finally, no two firms will form a coalition to deviate from the complete to the
partial network — by severing their links with the third firm — because Π  Π . Therefore, the
complete network is strongly stable.
3.2 Centralised wage-setting
This characterisation of wage setting, where an industry-wide union sets a uniform wage, is
consistent with existing practices in Norway, Finland, Ireland and Portugal (see OECD, 2004).
For all levels of spillovers within an R&D network , the firms’ profits are ranked as follows:
Π Π  Π  Π  Π  Π (2)
Note, importantly, that the ranking of Π and Π depends on , and it will be important
for our results below. Specifically, Π  Π if and only if   ∗ ≈ 04895.16
Proposition 2: Assume centralised wage-setting. (i) The complete network is pairwise stable
but not strongly stable. (ii) If within-network R&D spillovers are sufficiently large, the
partial network is both pairwise and strongly stable. (iii) Neither the empty nor the star
network is ever pairwise stable.
Part (i) is proved as follows. Pairwise stability is implied by Π  Π — a firm in the
complete network will not unilaterally sever a link to become a spoke in the star; of course, this
also implies that the star network is not itself pairwise stable, as part (iii) states. Although
the three firms in the complete network will not jointly deviate to the empty network (because
Π  Π), it is the case that (in contrast to decentralisation) two of the firms in the complete
network will force a deviation to the partial network by severing their links with the third firm
(because Π  Π). Thus, the complete network is no longer strongly stable.
16Thus Π and Π intersect only once on  ∈ [0 1].
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By comparing (2) and (1), note that Π  Π under centralisation but not under decen-
tralisation — this is the key condition that undermines the strong stability of the complete
network under centralisation. Intuitively, Π  Π arises under centralisation because the
uniform wage mitigates the hold-up problem faced by the insiders in the partial network, who
enjoy substantially greater access to R&D results than the isolated, outsider firm. However,
under decentralisation, the hold-up problem leads the linked firms in the partial network to pay
substantially higher wages than the isolated firm — hence Π  Π .
Part (ii) of Proposition 2 is proved as follows. Pairwise stability requires Π  Π , which
holds and ensures that neither of the insiders will unilaterally break their link (this also, of
course, implies that the empty network is not pairwise stable — part (iii) of Proposition 2).
However, because Π  Π (a spoke in the star network earns more than the outsider in the
partial network), pairwise stability also requires Π  Π to rule out a deviation to the star
network — i.e. that the insiders in the partial network earn more than the hub in the star.
In turn, Π  Π holds for   ∗ ≈ 04895 — i.e. sufficiently large within-network R&D
spillovers. It seems reasonable to suppose that this requirement will be satisfied because the
degree of spillovers within a network is, to a significant extent, a choice variable for the firms
involved.
The intuition behind the need for sufficiently large spillovers to ensure Π  Π runs as
follows. Both the insiders in the partial network and the hub in the star benefit from a rise in
spillovers. However, the partial-network insiders benefit by more because they are competing
against an unconnected, outsider firm — whereas all firms, hub and spokes, in the star network
benefit from greater R&D spillovers.
Finally, if the partial network is pairwise stable (which rules out deviations to empty/star),
then it follows immediately that it is also strongly stable because Π  Π — that is, the insiders
in the partial network will not agree to a coalitional deviation to the complete network.
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3.3 Centralisation versus Decentralisation
The comparison of centralised and decentralised wage-setting (Propositions 1 and 2) gives us a
key result:
Proposition 3: If within-network R&D spillovers are sufficiently large, then a transition from
centralised to decentralised wage-setting causes the complete network to displace the partial
network as the unique strongly stable network.
This result is consistent with the stylised facts, surveyed in the Introduction, that the
growth of R&D networks between firms has accompanied labour market deregulation. Moreover,
the qualification in Proposition 3 on the size of spillovers is needed only to pin down the
strongly stable network under centralised wage-setting (as the partial network). As Proposition
1 makes clear, we can be confident — even for small within-network R&D spillovers,  — that the
introduction of decentralised wage-setting will provoke the formation of the complete network.
Thus, labour labour deregulation that results in decentralised wage-setting would never be
expected to lead to a fall in the number of R&D links between firms.
For any wage-setting regime, the ranking of firm profits is clearly central to the determination
of the equilibrium R&D network/s. Common to the profit rankings for both decentralisation
and centralisation, (1) and (2), is
Π  Π  Π  Π  Π (3)
The variable is the position in the ranking of Π .
The “common” ranking in (3) above makes intuitive sense. The outsider in the partial
network performs worse than any of the firms in the empty network (Π  Π) because it is
in a weaker position vis-à-vis its competitors (who are linked), whereas all firms in the empty
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network are identical.17 Likewise, compared to a firm in the complete network, the hub firm in
the star performs better (Π  Π) and the spoke firms worse (Π  Π) — that is, deleting a
link from the complete network benefits the hub-designate but harms the spokes-designate.
In relative terms, Π is higher under centralisation than under decentralisation. As explained
above, this can be understood by considering the hold-up problem faced by the insider firms
in the partial network. Under centralisation, there is one industry-wide union and a uniform
wage — therefore, there is relatively little hold-up of the linked firms in the partial network.
In contrast, under decentralisation, there are three independent unions, so the insiders in the
partial network face substantially higher wages than the outsider.
4 Coordinated wage-setting
Centralisation and decentralisation may be regarded as the two extreme forms of wage-setting
regime in the presence of trade unions. Therefore, partly as a robustness check, we consider an
intermediate regime in this section — “coordination”.18 Under coordination, a single industry-
wide union sets firm-specific wages.
We believe that coordinated wage-setting is a fair representation of some recent reforming
trends in employment relations in continental Europe. For example, in Germany, the Nether-
lands and, to some extent, in Spain, wage negotiations include “opening” clauses, which, under
certain circumstances, allow firms to negotiate with their workforce wages below the level col-
lectively agreed at an industry level (see OECD, 2004). Moreover, coordination also appears
to characterise the arbitration system in Australia where wage negotiations have progressively
moved towards the level of the individual enterprise with a “safety net” at national level (see,
again, OECD, 2004).
An alternative interpretation of coordinated wage-setting would be that firm-specific unions
17Adding a single link to the empty network benefits the insiders-designate but harms the outsider-designate.
18Our terminology again follows Haucap and Wey (2004).
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act collusively with a view to coordinating their wage claims.
For all levels of spillovers within an R&D network , the firms’ profits under coordination
are ranked as follows:
Π  Π Π  Π  Π  Π (4)
Note that the ranking of Π and Π depends on , and it will be important for our results
below. Specifically, Π  Π if and only if   ∗∗ ≈ 07686.
Proposition 4: Under co-ordinated wage-setting, the complete network is the unique pairwise
stable network for all levels of within-network R&D spillovers, and it is strongly stable if
spillovers are sufficiently small.
We first prove that the complete network is the unique pairwise stable network (and thus
the only candidate for strong stability). To rule out pairwise stability for the other networks,
observe that Π  Π (so the empty network is not pairwise stable); Π  Π and Π  Π
(so the partial network is not pairwise stable); and Π  Π (so the star network is not pairwise
stable). The final inequality also establishes, of course, that the complete network is pairwise
stable.
However, the complete network is strongly stable only if  is sufficiently small. There will be
no coalitional deviation to either the star network (from the pairwise stability analysis above)
or to the empty network (because Π  Π). A coalitional deviation to the partial network,
where two of the firms in the complete network sever their links with the third, can be ruled
out as long as Π  Π — that is, as long as  is sufficiently small (technically,   ∗∗).
Putting the last result slightly differently, a coordinated wage-setting system destabilises
the complete network when spillovers are large — in much the same way, qualitatively, as occurs
under centralisation. In this case, a coalition of two firms has incentives to sever its links with
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the third firm in order to form the partial network. This is so because when the spillover level
is high enough, the competitive advantage of the linked firms in the partial network is large
enough to outweigh the negative business stealing effect that stems from the lower wage costs of
the isolated firm.19 Hence, the complete network emerges as the unique strongly stable network
only when spillovers are not too large.
Therefore, to understand network formation under coordination, we might say that the
same intuition applies as under decentralisation when spillovers are sufficiently small: that is,
the complete network is strongly stable because Π  Π . However, the same intuition applies
as under centralisation when spillovers are sufficiently large: that is, the strong stability of the
complete network is undermined by Π  Π , which provokes a group deviation to the partial
network.20
Within the “common” ranking of profits (3), the relative position of Π under coordination
is a halfway house — lower than under centralisation but higher than under decentralisation.21
This can be explained as follows. In the partial network under coordination, the linked (insider)
firms face higher wages than the outsider, but the wage differential between the insiders and
the outsider is lower than under decentralised wage-setting. Indeed, using the equilibrium
expressions in Mauleon et al. and Appendix, the insider/outsider wage gap under decentralised
and coordinated wage-setting is given by
 − 3 = 4032(− ¯)(10− 3)1117225− 9027(10− 3)
 − 3 = 8(− ¯)(2− )793− 29(2− ) (5)
19Recall that, in contrast to centralisation, the wage is not uniform under coordination. Thus, coordination
combines elements of the other two wage-setting systems: a centralised union but firm-specific wages.
20Note, however, that the partial network is not pairwise stable (and so cannot be strongly stable) under
coordination because, unlike under centralisation with large , Π  Π and Π  Π so there will be a
pairwise deviation to the star network.
21Under coordination, the level of Π relative to the other profit terms is either the same as under decentrali-
sation or higher. Likewise, under centralisation, the relative level of Π is either the same as under coordination
or higher.
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where the superscripts  and  denote decentralisation and coordination, respectively, and  =
1 2. It is straightforward to show that  − 3   − 3 ∀. We note that this difference
in the insider/outsider wage gap arises because, under coordination, the single industry-wide
union internalises the negative externality created by a wage cut at a single firm — in a way that
does not occur when three independent unions compete under decentralisation.
Compared to coordination, the larger insider/outsider wage gap within the partial network
under decentralisation reduces the cost advantage of the linked firms relative to the isolated one,
which works towards destabilising the partial network. Consequently, as we saw in Proposition
1, the complete network is the unique strongly stable network when wages are set at the firm-
level by competing trade unions.
5 Discussion
In this section we investigate some additional aspects of our results.
Aggregate profits. We first examine the relation between unionisation structure and total
profits. Setting aside extremely high values of within-network R&D spillovers, we can show
that total profits are increasing in the number of R&D links within the industry for all three
unionisation structures — that is, industry profits are maximised in the complete network.22
Therefore, recalling our equilibrium results on strongly stable networks, it is clear that individual
and collective incentives for R&D collaboration do not always coincide. Such misalignment is
particularly severe under centralised wage-setting: the partial network is the unique strongly
stable network, whereas it does not maximise industry profits. However, the conflict between
individual and collective incentives is totally eliminated under a decentralised wage-setting
system. Thus, in the pursuit of their private interests, industry participants are more likely to
achieve an outcome that is collectively beneficial the less centralised the wage-setting system is.
22Relevant plots available on request.
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Aggregate effective R&D investment and employment. Our analysis complements
Haucap and Wey (2004), who investigate how the three different wage-setting regimes we have
used affect firms’ investment incentives and industry employment when two firms race to be
the first to discover a new labour-saving innovation. They find — in line with us — that a
decentralised system leads to the highest employment level. However, they also demonstrate
that a centralised system creates the largest investment incentives. In contrast, we find that,
for sufficiently large within-network R&D spillovers, a decentralised union structure performs
best in terms of equilibrium effective R&D investment.23 Finally, in line with us, Haucap
and Wey view coordination as the worst solution — in terms of both R&D and employment
performance.24 This is troubling because coordinated wage-setting arguably characterises recent
trends in continental Europe towards greater wage flexibility.
Aggregate union utility. We now examine the relation between unionisation structure
and total union utility. Under centralisation and coordination, we find that initially the com-
plete, then the star, and eventually the partial network maximise total union utility; whereas,
under decentralisation, only the complete and the star network are utility-maximising archi-
tectures.25 As it turns out, union and firm incentives for R&D collaboration do not coincide.
Importantly, however, the likelihood of a conflict becomes smaller as the degree of wage-setting
centralisation decreases.26
It might also be wondered which unionisation leads to highest total union utility. Our analy-
sis here — in line with the existing literature (e.g. Davidson, 1988) — reveals that a centralised
system creates higher union utility than a decentralised one.27 This is because a centralised
23Again, relevant plots are available on request. As is usual (see, e.g., Kamien et al., 1992), “effective R&D”
refers to the total amount of R&D output that is applied to production — that is, the sum of a firm’s own R&D
output and the R&D outputs that it can access through links with other firms.
24We would therefore offer some support for Haucap and Wey’s labour-market policy prescription: decentralisa-
tion (i.e. the banning of monopoly-unions altogether) is best. If, however, monopoly unions are allowed then wage
negotiations should take place under non-discrimination rules — i.e. centralisation is preferred to coordination.
25Again, plots supporting these claims are available on request.
26Within the range of  values, the likelihood of a conflict becomes approximately 60%, 43% and 6% in the
move toward a less centralised wage-setting regime.
27This result, however, contrasts with Mukherjee and Pennings (2011), who demonstrate that total union utility
can be higher under decentralised unions, as long as different firm characteristics (conditional on the unionisation
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union structure internalises the product-market effects of each firm’s wage on the competitive
position of its rivals. Interestingly, we also find that total union utility is higher under cen-
tralisation than under coordination — thus, centralisation is best in terms of union utility. One
might suspect that an industry-wide union will always prefer coordination to centralisation —
since coordination gives extra ‘degrees of freedom’ to the union. However, this is not the case
in the present setting: the effects of unionisation structure on union utility are influenced by
the R&D network and, as we have shown, centralisation and coordination induce the formation
of different network structures.
Asymmetric labour productivities. As a caveat to the conclusions drawn above, we
note that our analysis has assumed that labour productivity is equal across firms. We now
consider the implications of relaxing this assumption. Bastos et al. (2009) provide a model
where a central monopoly union sets a uniform wage for all workers in the industry. After a
common wage floor has been determined, firm-specific rent-sharing takes place and results in
a wage cushion on top of the wage floor. Their model also allows for (ex-ante) heterogeneous
firms, as captured by a mean-preserving spread of labour productivities.
Embedding such a wage-setting system and firm heterogeneity within a network formation
game with endogenous R&D investments compromises analytical feasibility. However, the sim-
ple model employed here allows us to draw some conjectures about what would happen in this
general setting. Specifically, more productive firms would form network links to strengthen their
cost advantage relative to less productive ones. This would further increase firm heterogeneity,
leading the central union to set a lower wage floor (so as to stimulate employment in the less
productive firms).28 However, greater firm heterogeneity and a lower wage floor would also work
toward a higher wage cushion (Bastos et al., 2009). If the extent of local rent-sharing is limited,
then firms with linkages — who enjoy higher labour productivity than those without — would not
structure) arise.
28Bastos et al. (2009, p. 443) note that this effect arises for “reasonable parameter configurations”.
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suffer a lot in product-market competition.29 As a result, an asymmetric industry structure,
such as a partial network, would emerge in equilibrium. If, however, local rent-sharing is sub-
stantial, then the attractiveness of the partial network may depend on the initial productivity
spread between firms. That is, if the initial productivity differences are relatively small, the
cost advantage of linked firms may be eroded by wage increases, thereby providing an incentive
for denser networks.
Relation of our results to the wider literature. Our findings imply that denser R&D
networks are more likely to emerge as the degree of wage-setting centralisation decreases. This
implied relationship between R&D network formation and labour market deregulation is consis-
tent with the stylised facts. However, other explanations have been advanced for understanding
the growth in the number of R&D networks relative to more traditional forms of inter-firm
cooperation. First, non-equity forms of partnerships, such as R&D networks, offer participat-
ing firms increased flexibility to respond quickly to changing market conditions because they
are typically easier to establish, administer and dissolve than equity-based agreements, such as
RJVs (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999). Such flexibility is particularly important in the modern
business world as a result of short technology cycles and high costs of doing R&D. Second,
the legal framework across counties has undergone a process of harmonisation, which makes
easier the enforcement of the contracts that underlie the organisation of R&D alliances. It is
a task for future empirical work to attempt to discriminate between these various accounts of
the increasing prevalence of R&D networks.
6 Conclusion
R&D collaboration through networks in high-tech sectors has increased markedly over recent
years. At the same time, many industrialised countries have reformed their wage-setting in-
29Rent-sharing can be seen as reflecting the relative bargaining powers of each firm and its local union under
efficient bargaining.
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stitutions in the direction of greater decentralisation. Our model examines the influence of
wage-setting institutions on R&D network formation, and our results are consistent with these
two stylised facts.
A core idea is that a decentralised system of wage-setting, where labour is supplied to the
industry through competing trade unions, creates a “business stealing effect”: linked firms, who
enjoy superior access to R&D results, pay substantially higher wages than isolated firms, and
this wage premium harms the networked firms in product-market competition. By bringing
outsiders into the R&D network, which leads to the equalisation of wage rates across firms, the
linked firms are able to reduce the business stealing effect. Hence, the complete R&D network
arises under decentralised wage-setting. In contrast, there is no business stealing effect under
centralised wage-setting, where a single industy-wide union sets a uniform wage for all firms.
In consequence, we show that the equilibrium network has an insider/outsider pattern under
centralisation. Finally, under coordination, we show that the complete R&D network arises in
equilibrium, but only if within-network R&D spillovers are sufficiently small.
Therefore, labour market deregulation towards more decentralised wage-setting structures is
expected to induce the formation of denser R&D networks, and it can be seen as an alternative
explanation for the empirical fact that R&D collaborations have become significantly more
prevalent over recent years. Of course, a task for future work is a more thorough empirical
testing of this hypothesis in the context of other potential explanations.
Our model has several special features, which further work might seek to relax. In particular,
we have assumed a three-firm industry. As Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) note, the analysis
of networks with an arbitrary number of firms is currently beyond reach. However, we can draw
some conjectures about what one might expect to happen in that situation. We believe that
the mechanisms that underlie our main result would still survive: in essence, a decrease in the
degree of wage-setting centralisation widens wage differentials and favours firms with a small
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number of links relative to firms with a larger number of links, who will become more exposed
to the hold-up problem. Thus, the progressive decentralisation of wage-setting is expected to
induce a larger number of R&D collaborations.
A more thorough welfare analysis — bringing together consumer, producer and worker welfare
into aggregate social welfare — is also a topic for future work.
7 Appendix: Equilibrium outcomes
Let  = 175+4(7−5);  = 61−4(1−);  = 4900+[22400−11853+982(37−12)];
∆ = 3172 + [1128− 433 + 62(15− 4)]; Ω = 175− 9(10− 7);  = 793− 29(2− ).
The solutions for decentralised wage-setting come from MSMV (2008). In all cases, profit is
given by  = (− ) − ()2. We use the superscripts  (for uniform wage) and  to denote
centralisation and coordination respectively. We note that the linearity of our model ensures
that second-order conditions are always satisfied. For the complete, star and partial networks,
the equilibrium values are nonnegative for all values of   ∈ (0 1].
7.1 Complete network
Equilibrium quantities in stage 4 are
 = 14[(− ¯)− + (3− 2) + (2 − 1)( + )]
 = 14[(− ¯)− 3 +  +  + (3− 2) + (2 − 1)( + )]
where the subscripts  6=  6=  denote firms.
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In stage 3, unions set wages
 = 1
6
[3(− ¯) + (1 + 2)X3
1
]
 = 12[(− ¯) +  + ( + )]  6=  6= 
In stage 2, firms invest in R&D to maximise their profits,  = ()2 − ()2. Maximis-
ing profits and imposing symmetry  =  = , we obtain the equilibrium firm-level R&D
investments
 = (17− 14)(− ¯)
 = (3− 2)(− ¯)
Substitutions yield the rest of the equilibrium solutions for the firm-level variables
 = 24(− ¯)
 = 7[41 + 4(17− 7)](− ¯)22
 = 96(− ¯)
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
Centralisation
 = 8(− ¯)
 = (5 + 2)(11− 2)(− ¯)22
 = 32(− ¯)
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
Coordination
7.2 Star network
Let firm 1 be the hub and firms 2 and 3 be the spokes.
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Under centralisation, the equilibrium values are
1 = (17− 14)[28 + 9(16− 7)](− ¯)
2 = 3 = 2(34− 21)[7 + (31− 14)](− ¯)
1 = 24[28 + 9(16− 7)](− ¯)
2 = 3 = 96[7 + (31− 14)](− ¯)
1 = 7(1 + 2)(41− 14)[28 + 9(16− 7)]2(− ¯)2 2
2 = 3 = 28(2 + 3)(82− 21)[7 + (31− 14)](− ¯)2 2
 = 244[12 + (56− 25)](− ¯)
Under coordination, the equilibrium values are
1 = (3− 2)[52 + 3(8− 3)](− ¯)∆
2 = 3 = 6(2− )[13 + (5− 2)](− ¯)∆
1 = 8[52 + 3(8− 3)](− ¯)∆
2 = 3 = 32[13 + (5− 2)](− ¯)∆
1 = (11− 2)(5 + 2)[52 + 3(8− 3)]2(− ¯)2∆2
2 = 3 = 4(22− 3)(10 + 3)[13 + (5− 2)]2(− ¯)2∆2
1 = 16(104 + (44− 17))∆
2 = 3 = 8(208 + 3(28− 11))∆
7.3 Partial network
Let firms 1 and 2 be the linked insiders in the partial network and firm 3 be the isolated outsider.
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Under centralisation, the equilibrium values are
1 = 2 = (17− 7)(− ¯)Ω
3 = 17[7− (10− 7)](− ¯)7Ω
1 = 2 = 24(− ¯)Ω
3 = 24[7− (10− 7)](− ¯)7Ω
1 = 2 = 7(1 + )(41− 7)(− ¯)2Ω2
3 = 41[7− (10− 7)]2(− ¯)27Ω2
 = 32[21− (10− 7)](− ¯)7Ω
Under coordination, the equilibrium values are
1 = 2 = 13(3− )(− ¯)
3 = 3[13− (2− )](− ¯)
1 = 2 = 104(− ¯)
3 = 8[13− (2− )](− ¯)
1 = 2 = 169(11− )(5 + )(− ¯)22
3 = 55[13− (2− )]2(− ¯)22
1 = 2 = 8[52− (2− )](− ¯)
3 = 16[26− (2− )](− ¯)
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7.4 Empty network
The symmetric equilibrium values are
 = 17(−¯)175
 = 24(−¯)175
 = 41(−¯)24375
 = 96(−¯)175
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
Centralisation
 = 3(−¯)61
 = 8(−¯)61
 = 55(−¯)23721
 = 32(−¯)61
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
Coordination
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8 Appendix: For Referees — Not For Publication
Figure 1: Firm-Level Profits under Centralised Wage-Setting30
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Key: Π denotes the hub firm’s profits in the star network; Π denotes the profits of an insider (linked) firm
in the partial network; Π denotes a firm’s profits in the complete network; Π denotes a spoke firm’s profits
in the star network; Π denotes a firm’s profits in the empty network; and Π denotes the profits of outsider
(isolated) firm in the partial network.
Figure 2: Firm-Level Profits under Coordinated Wage-Setting
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Key: As figure 1 above.
30We use “Mathematica 4” for the Figures. Since − ¯ is a scaling parameter, in all plots we have set it equal
to 1.
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Figure 3: Aggregate Profits under Centralised Wage-Setting
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Key:  denotes industry profits in the complete network;  denotes industry profits in the star network;
 denotes industry profits in the partial network; and  denotes industry profits in the empty network.
Figure 4: Aggregate Profits under Coordinated Wage-Setting
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Key: As figure 3 above.
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Figure 5: Aggregate Effective R&D Investment
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Key: () denotes aggregate effective R&D in the complete network under decentralised () wage-setting;
() denotes aggregate effective R&D in the partial network under centralised () wage-setting; and ()
denotes aggregate effective R&D in the complete network under coordinated () wage-setting.
Figure 6: Aggregate Employment
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Key: () denotes industry employment in the complete network under decentralised () wage-setting;
() denotes industry employment in the partial network under centralised () wage-setting; and() denotes
industry employment in the complete network under coordinated () wage-setting.
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Figure 7: Total Union Utility under Decentralised Wage-Setting
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Key:  denotes total union utility in the complete network;  denotes total union utility in the star
network;  denotes total union utility in the partial network; and  denotes total union utility in the empty
network.
Figure 8: Total Union Utility under Centralised Wage-Setting
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Key: As figure 7 above.
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Figure 9: Total Union Utility under Coordinated Wage-Setting
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Key: As figure 7 above.
Figure 10: Total Union Utility — Comparison between Unionisation Structures
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Key: () denotes total union utility in the complete network under decentralised () wage-setting;  ()
denotes total union utility in the partial network under centralised () wage-setting; and () denotes total
union utility in the complete network under coordinated () wage-setting.
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